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ABSTRACT 
The Hard Target Void Sensing Fuze (HTVSF) is a Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) initiative that is being managed by the United 
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM). The JCTD Program seeks to accelerate the 
development and operational evaluation of mature and maturing technologies and 
rapidly transit new capability to address military problems. HTVSF is a 
programmable smart fuze that shall comprise several modes, capable of counting the 
number of 'voids' or levels it passed through as well as functioning based on time 
delay. It aims to enhance weapon effects by detonating the PGMs, namely Guided 
Bomb Unit missiles (GBU-24 and GBU-28), with penetrator warheads such as BLU 
109 and BLU 113 (Bomb Live Unit) at the desired location by functioning reliably 
after penetrating >10000 psi concrete.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost savings and the benefits of 
implementing the HTVSF capability. This thesis will conduct a business case 
analysis, including a baseline analysis and an extensive sensitivity analysis focusing 
on the ROI of HTVSF and its capability to support transition decisions of HTVSF 
JCTD. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Hard Target Void Sensing Fuze (HTVSF) is a Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) initiative managed by the United States Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM). The JCTD Program seeks to accelerate the development 
and operational evaluation of mature and maturing technologies and rapidly transit 
new capabilities to address military problems.  
The HTVSF is a smart fuze that will comprise several modes of operation, 
especially the capability to count the number of 'voids' or levels it penetrates and 
detonate on a time delay. It aims to enhance weapon effects by detonating the 
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) (namely 2,000 lbs. and 5,000 lbs. systems ) at 
the desired penetration location by functioning reliably after penetrating high strength 
concrete (>10,000 psi).1 The JCTD seeks to develop HTVSF to be employed against a 
new and emerging class of hard and deeply buried targets, provide risk reduction for 
future weapon and fuze integration efforts, and facilitate mass production of HTVSF. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze cost savings, as well as other benefits 
associated with the execution of the HTVSF program. This thesis will conduct a 
business case analysis and an extensive sensitivity analysis focusing on the ROI of 
HTVSF and its capability to support transition decisions of HTVSF JCTD. 
To establish a Business Case Analysis base case for HTVSF, a notional 
(hypothetical) scenario was crafted where 10 sorties of Strike Eagle Fighters (F-15Es) 
are tasked to perform continuous strike operations against Hard and Deeply Buried 
Targets (HDBTs) in Country A, 720 nm away from Alpha Air Base for a period of 24 





                                                 
1 The American Concrete Institute defines high-strength concrete as concrete with a compressive 
strength greater than 6000 psi. The primary difference between high-strength concrete and normal-
strength concrete relates to the compressive strength that refers to the maximum resistance of a 
concrete sample pressure [1]. 
 xiv
Table 1.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 




HTVSF FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research Development 
Test & Evaluation 164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope)  
T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 237.41 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Line = 1 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4783 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Number of Defense Line = 2 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  221.29 249.15   
Potential Cost Savings 
=  27.86   
ROI (%) =  16.92   
 
• Cost Savings 
• The estimated cost savings between employment of missiles 
equipped with HTVSF and missiles equipped with FMU-143 
are summarized in Table 1 above.  
• The estimated cost to employ GBU-24 equipped with HTVSF 
is $221.29M (FY18$), compared to the cost of GBU-24 
equipped with FMU-143 at $249.15 (FY18$). This translates to 
a savings of 11.2%. 
• The base case Return on Investment (ROI) is 16.92%, based on 
a Cost Savings of $27.86M (FY18$) and Investment of 
$164.57M (FY18$).  
 xv
Figure 1 shows the interactions between Cost Savings, Probability of Survival 
of F15Es (Ps), Number of Lines of Defense and Number of missions. The following 
key observations are made:  
• For the base case (first mission) with three lines of defense, the 
maximum potential cost savings is about 123M (FY18$) 
• For Mission 2 and subsequent missions, the Cost Savings remains 
positive for all numbers of defense lines and Ps. This is intuitive as the 
RDT&E cost of HTVSF is considered as non –recurring from Mission 
2 onwards. 
• For both missions, Cost Savings for Ps=0.9 starts to decrease at around 
three lines of defense lines. Cost Savings for Ps=0.95 starts to decrease 
at about seven lines of defense. This shows that the returns of 
employing HTVSF diminish rapidly if Ps is low where aircraft attrition 
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Table 2.   Cost Savings comparison of various factors used in Base Case and 
Sensitivity Analysis. (All costs in FY18$M) 










RDT&E 165 192 0.43 
Subsequent Mission 
(RDT&E) 165 0 192.43 
Subsequent Mission 
(Probability of 
Survival, Ps of F15E 
and Defense Layers) 
• Ps = 0.95 
• Number of 
Defense 
Layers =2 
• RDT&E = 
165 
• Ps = 0.98 
• Number of 
Defense 
Layers =1 
• RDT&E = 
0 
52.06 
Number of Defense 
Layers 2 3 75.45 
Number of Defense 
Layers and Ps of F15E 
• Number of 
Defense 
Layers =2 
• Ps = 0.95 
• Number of 
Defense 
Layers =3 
Ps = 0.98 
-31.41 
First Unit Cost, T1 154 635 0 
Learning Slope, b 90% 100% 5.98 




• Sensitivity Analysis (with respect to Base Case) 
Table 2 shows the summary of the cost comparison of various factors used in 
Base Case and Sensitivity Analysis. 
• RDT&E Sensitivity. With all other factors held constant, the 
base case ROI never falls below 0% when the RDT&E for 
HTVSF increases (about 16%) from $164.57M to $192M 
(FY18$). 
• Subsequent Mission Sensitivity. With all other factors held 
constant, the base case ROI increases 700% in the immediate 
mission after the base case in 2018. In the immediate mission 
where the probability of survival of F15E increased from 0.95 
to 0.98 and there is only a single line of defense, there is still an 
increase in cost savings of 58%. 
 xvii
• Number of Defense Layers and Probability of survival of F15E 
Sensitivity. If the number of defense layers increases from 2 to 
3 and the probability of survival of F15E increases from 0.95 to 
0.98, there is a minor deficit in the ROI of 19%. 
• Theoretical First Unit Cost Sensitivity. With all other factors 
held constant, the base case ROI does not fall below 0% even 
when the theoretical First Unit Cost increases from $154k to 
$635k (FY18$) (312% increase). 
• Learning Slope of Production Curve Sensitivity. With all other 
factors held constant, the base case ROI remains positive at 
3.63%, even when the learning slope increases from 90% to 
100% (i.e., no learning in production line). 
• Bottom Line 
• Aircraft attrition is proportional to the number of waves of 
F15Es sent to achieve the intended target kill. As such, the 
employment of missiles equipped with HTVSF saves both 
costs and enhances operation effectiveness compared to using 
the legacy fuze. 
• A low Probability of Survival of F15E will result in high 
aircraft attrition rates for missiles equipped with both types of 
fuzes. Return On Investment (ROI) for HTVSF diminishes 
rapidly with decreasing probability of F15E sorties crossing 
enemy’s lines of defense. 
• As the above mentioned factors are by no means a 
comprehensive list, the benefits of the HTVSF should not be 
limited to these factors presented in this paper. The operational 
advantages that cannot be quantified by employing HTVSF are 
1) The element of surprise created for the enemy and denial of 
reaction time on the first GBU-24 missile (equipped with 
HTVSF) strike on each target as compared to repeated strikes 
(missiles equipped with FMU-143) on the same target to 
achieve the same kill and 2) The boost in morale for the F15E 
pilots as their risk is greatly reduced since HTVSF equipped 
GBU-24 missiles ensure a high precision kill. 
• The HTVSF with programmable void sensing capability 
appears to be a critical investment that can provide the DoD 
with a new capability in Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat 
globally. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The Hard Target Void Sensing Fuze (HTVSF) is a Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) initiative managed by the United States Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM). As such, it is part of the JCTD Program, which seeks to 
accelerate the development and operational evaluation of mature and maturing 
technologies and rapidly transit new capabilities to address military problems. The 
HTVSF is a smart fuze that will feature several modes of operation, including the 
capability of counting the number of 'voids' or levels it passed through, as well as 
detonating on time delay. It aims to enhance weapon effects by detonating the PGMs 
(namely 2,000-lb. and 5,000-lb. systems) at the desired penetration location by 
functioning reliably after penetrating >10,000 psi high strength concrete. The JCTD 
seeks to develop HTVSF employment against the new and emerging class of hard and 
deeply buried targets, provide risk reduction for future weapon and fuze integration 
efforts, and facilitate mass production of HTVSF. The purpose of this study is to 
analyze the cost savings, as well as other benefits associated with the execution of the 
HTVSF Program. This thesis will conduct a business case analysis, including a 
baseline analysis and an extensive sensitivity analysis focusing on the ROI of HTVSF 
and its capability to support transition decisions of HTVSF JCTD. 
B.  PENETRATOR WARHEAD AND FUZE 
1. Penetrator Warheads 
The objective of the HTVSF JCTD is to design, develop, and demonstrate a 
hard target (>10,000 psi concrete) fuze with void sensing to survive and function in 
2,000- and 5,000-lb. weapons, BLU 109 and BLU 113 penetrator warheads, 
respectively. The specifications of the two warheads are shown in Figure 2. 
a. BLU-109 [2] 
The BLU series bomb bodies use PBNX-109 as explosive filler. The 
BLU-109A/B used with the GBU-24 and GBU-31 is a special purpose bomb that 
consists of steel alloy used for hardened targets. It is an improved 2,000-pound-class 
bomb designed as a penetrator without a forward fuze well. It has a slimmer 
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configuration and its skin is much harder than that of the standard MK-84 bomb. The 
skin is a single-piece, forged warhead casing of one-inch, high-grade steel. Its usual 
tail fuze is a mechanical-electrical FMU- 143. This 1,925-pound bomb has a 550-
pound tritonal high-explosive blast warhead. The BLU-109/B was always mated with 
a laser guidance kit to form a laser-guided bomb in Desert Storm (for example).  
b. BLU-113 [3] 
The Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) is a special weapon originally 
intended for penetrating hardened Iraqi command centers located deep underground. 
It is a 5,000-pound laser-guided conventional munitions that uses a 4,400-pound 
penetrating warhead (BLU 113). The GBU 28 “Bunker Buster” was put together in 
record time to support targeting of the Iraqi hardened command bunkers by adapting 
existing material. Work on the bomb was conducted in research laboratories, 
including the Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate located at Eglin 
AFB, Florida and the Watervliet Armory in New York.  
It was proven that the bomb could penetrate over 20 feet of concrete, 
while an earlier flight test had demonstrated the bomb's ability to penetrate more than 
100 feet of earth. The Air Force produced a limited quantity of the GBU-28s during 
Operation Desert Storm to attack multi-layered, hardened underground targets. Only 
two of these weapons were dropped in Desert Storm, both by F-111Fs. One weapon 
hit its precise aim point, and the onboard aircraft video recorder displayed an 
outpouring of smoke from an entrance way approximately 6 seconds after impact. 
After Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force incorporated some modifications, and 
further tested the munitions. The FY1997 budget request contained $18.4 million to 
procure 161 GBU-28 hard target penetrator bombs.  
 3
 
Figure 2.   Specifications of BLU 109 and BLU 113 
2. Warhead Fuze 
• What is a fuze? 
A fuze is a weapon subsystem/device that keeps the warhead safe for storage, 
transportation, handling and deployment.  
• Basic Functions of a Fuze 
• Safing - Keeping the weapon safe. 
• Arming - Getting the fuze ready to fire the warhead.  
• Sensing - Recognizing or detecting the presence of possible 
target or a collision. 
• Firing - Igniting the warhead at the most optimal time or preset 
delay time. 
• 2 Main States of Fuze 
The fuze is essentially a binary state mechanism. The two states that the fuze 
can be in are Safe state and Armed state. 
• Safe State. In the safe state, the fuze is prevented from igniting the 
warhead and will be safe for all logistics and operational deployment 
activities. 
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• Armed State. When a fuze is in the armed state, it means that all 
safeguards have been removed and the fuze is ready to ignite the 
warhead. It requires only a stimulus to ignite the warhead.  
3. Basic Fuze System  
Figure 3 shows the setup of a basic fuze system in a typical munition.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Basic Fuze System Setup (After: [4]) 
C.  HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGET DEFEAT  
1. Concept of Operations 
Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat (HDBTD) is the capability to deny 
sanctuary to adversaries by developing end-to-end capabilities for detection, 
characterization, target planning, defeat, and combat assessment directed at HDBTs, 
and other hard-to-defeat, high-value facilities. HDBTD employs a full range of 
measures to destroy, disrupt, or deny HDBTs as well as mission-critical elements 
within the networks that support, or are supported, by such facilities. This Joint War-
fighting Capability Objective (JWCO) was validated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) on December 22, 1999 [5]. Figure 4 shows the pictorial form of the concept of 










Figure 4.   HDBTD Concept of Operations  
2. Hard and Deeply Buried Targets 
Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs) are underground command and 
control bunkers, leadership quarters, garrisons, etc built out of reinforced concrete or 
tunneled into mountains. Due largely to the Gulf War and the present war in 
Afghanistan, U.S. military planners are particularly keen to find ways to destroy 
HDBTs. It is estimated that there are as many as 10,000 HDBT s worldwide, not all of 
which can be destroyed by conventional weapons. HDBTs involve all types of 
hardened above ground, shallow underground, and deep underground structures. 
Deeply buried facilities are extremely challenging targets. HDBTs differ with respect 
to function, which ranges from C4I operations; basing for surface-to-surface missiles; 
aircraft, artillery and other systems; and production and storage of Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) related or conventional munitions [6]. The main challenges 
posed by HDBTs are as follows: 
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• Depth of burial or other protective cover such as reinforced pre-
stressed steel tendon 
• Physical extent of layout 
• Infrastructure features (external and internal) 
• Active and passive defenses 
• Camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) measures 
• Proximity of civilian populations, cultural sites, and other 
juxtapositions impacting collateral damage assessments 
• Susceptibility to hard, functional, and full-dimensional defeat 
• Sensitivity to time of delivery 
D.  PROBLEM STATEMENT [7], [8] 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) reinforced the need to hold hard and deeply 
buried targets at risk. A reliable fuze that survives penetration and detonates the 
warhead in the desired location is critical to successfully doing that. Post OIF analysis 
indicates the intelligence available was less accurate than required for successful 
weaponeering. Additionally, the post OIF Combat Weapons Evaluation Assessment 
Team (CWEAT) report and other sources indicate that there is a trend toward 
harder/deeper targets exceeding the design parameters of existing fuzes and warheads. 
Finally, development and operational test as well as post OIF analysis show that 
current fuzes are unreliable at long time delays. Fuzes such as FMU-143 and FMU-
152 are sensitive to intelligence uncertainties and not designed for very hard targets. 
These limitations dictate a reliable, void sensing fuze capability designed for >10,000 
psi concrete is required if hard and deeply buried targets are to be held at risk. At the 
HTVSF JCTD level, two main problems that are often faced by decision-makers are 
as follows: 
1. What are the Technological Risks Involved?  
Mature technology exists to sense voids in hardened targets. Hard Target 
Smart Fuze (HTSF) [9] and Multi-Event Hard Target Fuze (MEHTF) both use 
hardened accelerometers to report data during hard target penetration. Numerous 
market sources have tested prototype hardware in high psi concrete targets, so the leap 
to greater than 10,000 psi seems an achievable increment in technology. However, 
some of the risks involved that require addressing are as follows. 
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• A problem exists in the ability to mass produce. Solving this problem 
is a focus of this JCTD.  
• There are other alternatives available to address the problem 
mentioned above, such as simpler, cheaper strain gauge technology 
(replacing more complex accelerometers) combined with void sensing 
algorithms that could be used to detect layers in hard targets. Current 
strain gauge configurations have been shown to survive and record 
target layers/voids, but are at a lower Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) than the HTSF and MEHTF fuzes have demonstrated. However, 
if strain gauge technology is successful, it may provide a cheaper and 
more reliable technology for void sensing in later generations of fuzes. 
• Challenges to developing potential technologies for HTVSF remains. 




Figure 5.   TRL of HTVSF Core Technologies (From: [7]) 
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Figure 6.   TRL and its Definitions (From: [10]) 
2. Does the HTVSF Supplement, Complement or Replace an Existing 
Program? 
HTVSF would complement existing fuzes. The FMU-143 and FMU-152 are 
still appropriate for BLU-109 applications against 5,000 psi targets where void 
sensing is not required. HTVSF would be used for >10,000 psi targets with high 
intelligence uncertainty. The Joint or Combined forces will benefit from this 
capability because HTVSF will be compatible with legacy hard target weapons, such 
as the BLU-113 and the BLU-109 (BLU-109 is used by USAF and USN). Future 
penetrators e.g., boosted penetrators, massive ordnance penetrator, or possibly high 
speed weapons could also take advantage of this fuze [11]. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
To achieve the objectives set out in Section A, the author will develop and 
recommend an analytical structure for performing business case analyses (BCA). The 
BCA for the HTVSF JCTD will then be conducted based on that structure, results 
reported, with appropriate recommendations reported for decision makers. The 
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comprehensiveness of the BCA presented is necessarily limited to the data and 
information made available to the author. However, the method that estimates cost 
saving and benefits obtained specific to this operational scenario can also be used to 
derive the savings and benefits for other, reasonably similar cases. Key assumptions 
made while performing the BCA are as follows:  
• A conservative approach is adopted, i.e., whenever a choice had to 
made between higher and lower costs due to ambiguity in the data, the 
higher cost is used. 
• Where information is not available, or cannot be made available to the 
author, estimates are used and reasonable assumptions are made and 
described in regards to how they are derived. 
 10
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II. BACKGROUND 
This section provides an overview of the current technologies that are 
currently employed in PGMs. It also includes new technologies that are being 
developed to enhance the survivability of fuzes after penetration, as well as 
addressing the problem of detonation by preset delay. A summary of the Joint 
Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program is also provided here, with 
details on the history and development of the HTVSF JCTD Program. Finally, the 
section concludes with an overview of the Business Case Analysis (BCA) 
methodology. 
A.  CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Current Technologies 
Standard fuzes found in penetrator warheads are equipped with preset delay 
mechanisms for detonation and are designed to penetrate and survive ~5000 psi 
concrete. However, as construction techniques and materials progress, targets are 
getting harder. A new smart fuze, designed to function reliably after penetrating 
>10,000 psi concrete, is required to counter the next generation of hard targets. It 
ignites the warhead at a desired time when the weapon is at its optimal location. The 
smart fuze will feature several modes of operation. However, the key capability is 
counting the number of voids based on sensing changes in acceleration, as there is 
limited intelligence on target protection levels. The development initiative of this 
smart fuze is termed as Hard Target Void Sensing Fuze (HTVSF).  
2. Legacy and Current Trends of Fuzes 
“Some of us worry that we’re not working on the new technologies of the 
future that we need to be … fuzes on hand are not smart enough ... not rugged enough 
... not durable enough at the price we’ve been paying for them, and we’re not putting 
enough money into the R&D of making them better,” as stated by Maj. Gen. Robert 
W. Chedister [12]. Improving Coalition Forces’ ability to hold hard or deeply buried 
targets at risk requires a reliable fuze that can sense when it enters a void. The void-
sensing capability mitigates a substantial part of the intelligence uncertainty 
surrounding targets because the weaponeering no longer needs to select a single time 
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delay based on the estimated thicknesses of target layers and estimated concrete 
strength. The previous projects, Hard Target Smart Fuze (HTSF) and Multi-Event 
Hard Target Fuze (MEHTF) successfully tested void sensing/layer counting ability 
[13]. HTSF and MEHTF both used hardened accelerometers to report data during 
hard target penetration. Numerous sources have tested prototype hardware in high psi 
concrete targets, so the leap to greater than 10,000 psi seems an achievable increment 
in technology. Both fuzes show that fuze initiation within a specific void or floor 
layer is technically feasible.  
3. Types of Legacy Fuzes in BLU-10 and BLU-113 
a. FMU-157/B Hard Target Smart Fuze (HTSF) 
A predecessor of HTVSF, the Hard Target Smart Fuze (HTSF) enables 
precision bombs with penetrating warheads to detonate at a desired point inside buried 
or reinforced concrete targets, such as underground bunkers and command centers. 
Similar to HTVSF, detonation occurs after a sensor tells the fuze that the weapon has 
passed through a pre-programmed number of hard layers or voids in the target. The 
HTSF, designated the FMU-157/B, is an active decision-making, accelerometer-based 
fuze system capable of counting layers and voids (floors), as well as calculating 
distance travelled. When the weapon reaches the pre-determined floor, it tells the 
bomb to explode. The HTSF is compatible with a variety of penetrating warheads. 
b. FMU-143B/B 
The FMU-143B/B Fuze System is an electromechanical fuze system 
that provides impact delay detonation for penetrating warheads. The fuze contains an 
explosive train, which is mechanically and electrically out-of-line until specific 
weapon launch cycle events have occurred. Once a valid launch has occurred, the fuze 
will arm in the selected arm time. This configuration has a selectable arm time of 5.5 
and 12 seconds. It has a fixed detonation delay after impact of 60 milliseconds. The 
fuze is powered by an air-driven turbine generator power supply called the FZU-32 
fuze initiator. The initiator is non-explosive and has no specific safety requirements. 
The fuze is equipped with a safety release assembly (housing and safety release shaft), 
and a connector to accept operating power. The fuze has a screwdriver-adjustable 
selector feature to select arming delay times. The fuze is threaded into the fuze well, 
 13
which is located at the aft end of the penetrator warhead. Prior to operational use, the 
fuze may be stored, transported worldwide, installed in a weapon, loaded on an 
aircraft, and flown during captive carriage without release [14]. 
c. FMU-152A/B (JPF) 
The FMU-152A/B, Joint Programmable Fuze (JPF) is a multifunction, 
multi-delay tail fuze system with hardened target capability for use in general purpose 
and penetrating unitary warheads. The JPF operates with a wide variety of guidance 
kits, high and low drag fins, and with all configurations of the DSU-33 proximity 
sensor to provide an airburst capability. When used with the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM), the JPF operating mode and other settings may be selected in 
flight from the cockpit through a serial RS-422 interface between the weapon and 
fuze [15]. 
B.  JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD) 
The Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program is partly 
related to the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program, which 
had its inception in 1994 by the Department of Defense (DoD) [16], [17], [18], [19]. 
1. The ACTD Program [19] 
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Technology) (DUSD/ 
AS&C) has oversight responsibility for the ACTD program. He is responsible for 
developing and promulgating guidance regarding the ACTD program, for evaluating 
candidates and approving new ACTDs, and for providing oversight, support and 
evaluation of ongoing ACTDs.  
ACTDs exploit mature advanced technologies to develop solutions for 
important military problems. Declining budget, significant changes in threats and 
acceleration in the pace of technology have created challenges to our ability to 
address significant military needs. In addition, global proliferations of military 
technologies, and potential adversaries with relatively easy access to these 
technologies, have increased the need to rapidly transition new technology from the 
developer to the user. The ACTDs are structured to address the needs of the 
warfighter by providing needed capabilities, addressing deficiencies, and reducing 
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costs or manpower requirements. Each ACTD is aimed at one or more warfighting 
objectives and is reviewed by the Services, Defense Agencies and the Joint Staff. 
Candidates will be proposed for initiation in each fiscal year. These candidates are 
reviewed for technical maturity and projected effectiveness. Those with the greatest 
potential will be submitted to the Joint Staff/Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) for prioritization.  
ACTDs can be characterized by their employment of mature technologies over 
a fixed period of activity. They can also leverage existing technological investments. 
There is also a residual capability after the completion of the ACTD demonstration. In 
addition, ACTDs have a heavy focus on joint operations with Combatant Command 
warfighter participation, as well as a significant level of cross-service, cross 
agency/organization involvement.  
The guidelines developed to provide guidance for the selection criteria for 
ACTD candidates are given as follows: 
• The time for complete evaluation of military utility is about 2–4 years 
• The technology should be sufficiently mature 
• The project shall provide a potentially effective response to a priority 
military need 
• A lead service or agency has been designated 
• The risks have been identified, are understood, and accepted 
• Demonstrations or exercises have been identified that will provide an 
adequate basis for the utility assessment 
• Funding is sufficient to complete the planned assessment of utility and 
to provide technical support for the first two years of fielding the 
interim capability 
• The developer is ready to prepare a plan that covers all essential 
aspects. These include affordability, interoperability, sustainability, 
and evolutionary capability, vis-à-vis technology and threat changes. 
The objectives of ACTDs are to conduct meaningful demonstrations of 
military utility, develop and test concepts of operations to optimize military 
effectiveness, and prepare to transition to acquisition without loss of momentum. 
Another major ACTD goal is to promote operational “jointness” to reach beyond 
individual Service interests and capabilities for integrated, joint missions. The 
interests of the warfighter are paramount and, therefore, “guidelines” regarding 
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ACTDs mentioned above are considered flexible. Last but not least, the ACTD is to 
provide a residual capability to further refine Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and 
to permit continued use prior to formal acquisition, as well as to provide the ability to 
proceed into formal acquisition for additional capability, if required. 
Possible outcomes after the ACTD operational demonstration are as follows 
[16]: 
• The user-sponsor may recommend acquisition of the technology and 
field the residual capability that remains at the completion of the 
demonstration phase of the ACTD to provide an interim and limited 
operational capability 
• If the user’s need is fully satisfied by the residual capability remaining 
at the conclusion of the ACTD, there is no requirement to acquire any 
additional units of the system 
• If the capability is deemed to not demonstrate sufficient military 
utility, the project is terminated or returned to the technology base for 
further development 
2. The JCTD Program [19] 
Since FY2006, a new business process called the JCTD model was initiated 
that takes the successful ACTD program and modifies it to better meet the 
Department’s transformational goal of becoming capability based. This capability 
based approach is intended to provide a faster and more integrated joint response that 
will meet emerging asymmetrical threats. The JCTD model includes many positive 
aspects of the ACTD program and is integrated with the Joint Capability Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS) developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 
Current ACTD processes will be transited to the improved JCTD program over a 3-5 
year period, with the intent of having JCTDs replace ACTDs. It will focus on joint 
and transformational technologies that are initiated in Science and Technology (S&T), 
and carried through the difficult transition stage. The new JCTD business model will 
also include a Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) pilot program that will take a 
limited number of “joint peculiar” JCTDs past Milestone B, into procurement, 
followed by initial sustainment, which is essentially a “cradle-to-grave” approach.  
The JCTD program comprises three possible transition models post-
demonstrations, as follows: 
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• Transition to Program of Record (POR). Once the military utility of the 
program has been successfully demonstrated, the concepts will be 
adopted by the warfighters. Technology or system will be transferred 
to a new/current POR or GSA (Government Services Administration) 
schedule. The acquisition of additional capability will also be funded. 
• Interim Capability to Meet Needs of the Warfighter. Same as above. 
However, the technology and system may or may not have been sent to 
a POR. This interim capability fully meets the warfighter’s needs and 
is being maintained. 
• Return to Technology Base. The military utility is deemed to be not 
successfully demonstrated. Relevant components or capabilities may 
be incorporated into other systems, returned to the technology base or 
terminated. 
C.  THE HARD TARGET VOID SENSING FUZE JCTD 
The 708th Armament Systems Group (708 ARSG), 308th Armament Systems 
Wing (ARSW), Eglin AFB, FL plan to fund a Joint Capabilities Technology 
Demonstration (JCTD) of a Hard Target Void Sensing Fuze System (HTVSF), a 
cockpit programmable system that will provide multi-delay arming and detonation, as 
well as void sensing functions for a BLU-113 or BLU-109 weapon to penetrate and 
destroy hardened targets protected by multiple layers of reinforced material. A quick 
overview of the HTVSF JCTD is illustrated the Quad Chart in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   HTVSF Quad Chart (From: [7]) 
1. Program Schedule 
The 27-month JCTD will engage two contractors with a firm fixed price 
contract of $8.6m per contractor inclusive of 20 residual fuzes. A rolling-down select2 
method is used to select the award of a contract in both the SDD and production 
phase. A sole contractor will be selected from the winner of the JCTD at an estimated 
contract value of $42.4m and $195m for 33 months SDD and production phase from 
FY2013 onwards respectively [21]. 
2. The JCTD Program  
The demonstration will conduct the activities shown in Figure 8. The objective 
of these activities is to design, develop, and demonstrate a hard target (>10,000 psi 
                                                 
2 Rolling down select across multiple phases of a program is used to reduce the number of 
separate, formal source selections which would otherwise occur. When the risks and funding for a 
major program or a multi-phased laboratory effort justify multiple awards for the first segment of the 
acquisition, and a reduced number of industry participants for the follow-on segment, a rolling down 
select can be used effectively to avoid delays, which would otherwise occur from sequential use of a 
traditional selection process [20]. 
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concrete) fuze with void sensing to survive and function with 2000- and 5000-lb 
systems. Two contractors will be selected for award of separate JCTD contracts to 
design, test, and demonstrate the capabilities of each of their proposed HTVSF 
systems. They will seek to meet the requirements specified in the System 
Requirements Document (SRD) [22]. On 31 March 2008, the contract was awarded to 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. [23] and Thales Missile Electronics LTD [24] at a contract 
amount of $8,737,741 and $8,770,000, respectively. During a planned 27 month 
period of performance, the two JCTD contractors will be evaluated against 
predetermined evaluation criteria, and one will be selected to deliver 20 residual 
HTVSF JCTD assets and will be awarded a follow-on System Demonstration and 
Development (SDD) contract. The single SDD contractor is expected to receive a 
sole-source follow-on production contract award for production of the HTVSF at an 
estimated contract value of $42.4 mil for 33 months. Pending a final determination 
regarding foreign source participation, the Government anticipates awarding one 
JCTD contract under full and open competition and the other under a competition 
restricted to U.S. sources only [25]. 
3. Program Exit Criteria 
The exit criteria for the HTVSF JCTD are as follows: 
• Survive and function during demonstration while penetrating 5000-
15000 psi concrete  
• Demonstrate successful capability for detecting and counting more 
than one void during target penetration 
• Demonstrate Time-delay Capabilities 
• Demonstrate Cockpit Programmability 
• Demonstrate trend toward affordability goal 
• Manufacturing capability to produce up to 100 fuzes per month 
D.  BUSINESS CASE ANALYSES [19], [26] 
A Business Case Analysis (BCA) is a basic financial tool used by decision 
makers to evaluate alternative approaches and to decide on the best courses of action, 




well structured and systematic methodology, provides a best-value analysis that 
considers not only cost, but also other quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors that 
are relevant to the investment decision.  
The BCA framework is an iterative process that is updated as the business and 
mission environment changes. It consists of the following elements: 
• Determine objectives of the case 
• Specify assumptions and constraints 
• Identify possible alternatives, including the status quo 
• Estimate costs and benefits of every alternative 
• Perform sensitivity analysis and risk analysis 
• Derive conclusions and make suitable recommendations 
A sound and reliable BCA is an unbiased and objective analysis of the 
financial consequences of the various alternatives. The reliability of the BCA is 
crucial in aiding the decision maker to make an informed choice. It is based on facts, 
reasonable assumptions, and sound financial principles with its conclusions traceable 
and transparent whenever possible. As a decision-making tool, a high-quality BCA 
process provides the decision maker with the relevant insights as to how the project 
supports the strategic objectives and how it can help achieve these objectives. This 
assessment is structured such that important information on the scope, alternatives, 
costs and benefits are laid out clearly, with the potential risks highlighted so that the 
decision-maker can make an informed decision on whether to invest in the project. 
As every BCA differs in the objectives, assumptions, constraints, risk and 
operating scenario, it is natural to expect that each BCA is customized for the 
particular case within a specific operating environment. However, a generic BCA 
methodology can be described as a 4-phase process, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
Definition1 Data Collection2 Evaluation Analysis3 Results Evaluation4
 
Figure 8.   BCA methodology  
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The basic steps to the above mentioned process are as follows. 
1. Definition 
In the first phase, the scope, assumptions and constraints will be defined to 
guide the analysis. Alternative options are also explored to ensure that there is a 
minimum of two outcomes (one of which could be maintaining the current status quo) 
available at the end of the analysis.  
2. Collection of Data 
In the second phase, a data collection plan is devised, so that the types of data 
required, the data sources, and how they can be obtained, can be mapped out. Models 
will also have to be developed so that the data can be categorized and stored, while 
preserving the data integrity. Data normalization is also applied where required. 
Where the data is not available, estimates can be made, as long as they can be 
justified, and the methodology adopted explained clearly. 
3. Analysis 
The third phase is where most of the BCA calculations are being 
accomplished. Data analysis is performed to build the case for each alternative. Each 
alternative is compared against the baseline so as to determine which one provides the 
best value. Risk analysis must be performed to identify the set of risks associated with 
each alternative, along with proposed risk-mitigating strategies. Sensitivity analysis 
aims to provide insights to the BCA results if the input parameters change or if 
assumptions change or are proven invalid. 
4. Presentation of Results 
In this last phase, the BCA results are summarized into appropriate graphs and 
tables for representation to the decision makers. The information presented should be 
concise, with relevant supporting evidence from the previous phases. A conclusion 
and recommended course of action should also be provided to the decision maker 





• Relative costs and benefits of various alternatives 
• Methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs 
• Influence and value of Performance / Cost / Schedule / Sustainment 
tradeoffs 
• Data required in support and justification of the decision 
• Sensitivity Analysis of assumptions  
• Risk Analysis of recommended decision 
• Recommendation and summary of the implementation of the decision 
for proceeding with the best value alternative 
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III. HARD TARGET VOID SENSING FUZE (HTVSF) 
BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
This section illustrates how the comparison of capabilities between HTVSF 
and legacy fuze (FMU-143) in a GBU-24 missile system carried by F15E will be 
conducted. Our hypothetical planning scenario describes the 24 hours strike 
operations on HDBTs using F15Es. The business case analysis will be performed 
based on the comparison of these F15Es performing strike operations using the two 
types of fuzes, namely HTVSF and FMU-143, in the GBU-24 missiles. First, the 
scenario on which the analysis is performed will be elaborated. The available data will 
then be analyzed. Next, a computation of return-on-investment (ROI), as well as 
sensitivity analysis on the key results, will be included. Finally, a general risk 
assessment for the HTVSF is made.  
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the benefits that HTVSF brings, 
vis-à-vis the existing FMU-143 fuze used in BLU-109 warheads as part of the GBU-
24 missile system. This analysis also factors in the platform support provided by F15E 
to perform HDBTD operations, and the considerations on aircraft attrition cost 
inflicted by the enemy’s air defense layers. An operational advantage to using HTVSF 
that cannot be quantified is the element of surprise and denial of reaction time for the 
enemy forces when the enemy target is destroyed with a single GBU-24 using 
HTVSF. This is compared to multiple bomb attacks using FMU-143 where the enemy 
would be alerted and has sufficient reaction time to escape before the next attack. 
A.  CAN HTVSF FILL THE GAP? 
The February 2004 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on 
Future Strategic Strike Forces looked ahead 30 years with the objective of providing 
the President with a broad range of strike options to protect the United States and her 
forces abroad, assure friends and allies of her future commitment, and deal with future 
adversaries on terms favorable to the United States. The Task Force identified 
currently planned systems that will still be relevant and recommended new systems 
for development. 
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The DSB Task Force recommended that USD (AT&L) immediately undertake 
an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) for a bomber-delivered 
massive penetrator. A family of massive ordnance payloads (20-30 klb.), both 
penetrator and blast variants, would be developed to improve conventional attack 
effectiveness against deep, expansive, underground tunnel facilities. 
A deep underground tunnel facility in rock geology poses a significant 
challenge for non-nuclear weapons. Such a target is difficult to penetrate, except 
possibly near an adit,3 and the likelihood of damaging critical functional components 
deep within the facility from an energy release at the adit is low. Past test experience 
has shown that 2,000 lb. penetrators carrying 500 lbs. of high explosives are relatively 
ineffective against tunnels, even when skipped directly into the tunnel entrance.  
Instead, several thousand pounds of high explosives coupled to the tunnel are 
needed to blow down blast doors and propagate a lethal air blast throughout a typical 
tunnel complex. This can be achieved either by an accurate blast weapon situated in 
front of the tunnel entrance or a penetrator that has burrowed directly into the tunnel. 
In both cases, the munition must be on the order of 20- to 30- klb to couple a 
sufficient amount of energy to the tunnel.  
The penetrator requires sufficient weight for penetration; the blast weapon 
requires sufficient weight for carrying high explosives. Optimized penetrators of this 
size may penetrate about 5 to 8 times farther than an existing 2,000 lb. weapon and 
may also be suitable for housing a clean, low-yield nuclear weapon. Using the tactic 
of optimum dual delivery, where a second penetrator follows immediately behind the 
first penetrator and boosting the penetrator velocity with a rocket motor, a depth of up 
to 40 meters can be achieved in moderately hard rock. In view of the promise of such 
a massive penetrator for both conventional and nuclear payloads, the DSB Task Force 
recommended an immediate start on an ACTD-like demonstration of this capability 
[27]. 
                                                 
3 An adit is a type of entrance to an underground mine which is horizontal or nearly horizontal [1]. 
Adits are usually built into the side of a hill or mountain, and often occur when a measure of coal or an 
ore body is located inside the mountain but above the adjacent valley floor or coastal plain [28]. 
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B.  HYPOTHETICAL OPERATION SCENARIO 
1. Background  
In early 2018, tension over Country A and Country B was growing again when 
Country B initiated massive campaigns to declare its independence from Country A. 
This move was supported by the U.S. and this highly escalated the situation between 
the two nations. U.S. facilities in the region sit within the conflict zone which is a 
swath of land and sea along Country A’s coast. This is an area reachable by cruise 
missiles, jet-borne precision bombs and local covert operatives. There are five U.S. 
Air Force bases within this area. In a conflict over Country B, any nation allowing “an 
intervening superpower” such as the U.S. to operate inside its territory can expect a 
Country A attack. Hence, the U.S. air bases close to Country A’s east coast region 
were subjected to immense threats from Country A as shown in Figure 9. When it 
comes to conflict with the U.S., Country A’s military analysts favor age-old 
schoolyard wisdom: Throw the first punch and hit hard. It is designed to strike 
America’s military suddenly, stunning and stalling the Air Force more than any other 
service.  
 
Figure 9.   Map of Country A missiles threat range near Country B  
Based on confirmed military intelligence regarding Country A’s course of 
action should a conflict arise, striking U.S. air bases around region of Country A/B 
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Straits, specifically command-and-control facilities, aircraft hangars and surface-to-air 
missile would be her first priority. As a countermeasure, suppose the U.S. Air Force 
would deem an efficient and responsive counter attack on Country A’s critical yet 
deeply buried underground command and control facilities, missile storage sites and 
aircraft hangars as a viable course of action. 
2. Threats Posed by Country A 
Suppose the U.S. clashes with Country A over Country B, Country A will 
employ its Strike First “Element of Surprise” Strategy. The following shows the 
various threats posed by Country A’s current military power. 
• Striking U.S. air bases such as command-and-control facilities, aircraft 
hangars and surface-to-air missile launchers could be Country A’s top 
priority 
• Country A could employ long-range anti-satellite missiles to destroy 
one or more American satellites 
• Country A fighter jets could possibly scramble to intercept aerial 
refueling tankers and cargo planes sent to shuttle in fuel, munitions, 
supplies or troops. They could also deploy high explosive cluster 
bombs to target pilot quarters and critical installations with key 
personnel.  
• Country A is designing ground-launched cruise missiles capable of 
nailing targets more than 900 nm away 
• Country A could also launch a nuclear “e-bomb,” or electromagnetic 
explosive, that would disable U.S. communication equipment while 
ionizing the atmosphere for minutes to hours 
3. Area of Operations 
The 4th Fighter Wing at Seymour Johnson AF Base, in North Carolina (the 
largest F-15E Strike Eagle operator in the world) was ordered to have 10 sorties of 
F15Es to be ready to deploy to Alpha Air Base. It is assumed that each F15E can only 
carry four GBU-24 missiles at one time. The distance of the HDBTs in Country A is 
approximately 720 nm away from Alpha Air Base. There are three possible defense 
layers imposed by Country A as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.   Map of scenario Area of Operations (AO) 
The F-15Es first began flying missions in the initial two weeks in support of 
all surveillance and reconnaissance missions as well as “Strike Familiarization” 
missions, which basically meant the air crews flew simulated missions against mock 
targets around Country B, so as to familiarize themselves with rules of engagements, 
local area procedures and flying over hostile territory. Based on intelligence reports, 
the Hard and Deeply Buried Targets such as senior leadership planning headquarters, 
ammunition and aircraft hangars, radars, radio relay stations, communications sites, 









Figure 11.   Critical Installations in Country A 
On March 25, the war began as Country A launched its first long war head to 
destroy one U.S. satellite. In response, the F-15Es dropped GBU-24s against key 
communication, command and control buildings, and leadership targets identified in 
the AO, but a few of the weapons missed their intended targets. The weapons are 
believed to have been affected by EA-6B Prowlers conducting jamming operations in 
the vicinity. As these missions are highly classified, only veteran F-15E crews 
participated in these missions. The F-15Es worked closely with Special Forces, 
operating deep inside the AO. The Special Forces provided rough damage assessment 
of the HDBTs intended for destruction as updated intelligence to the Strike Task 
Force.  
4. Model [29] 
Based on lessons learnt from Operation Iraqi Freedom and military 
intelligence on Country A’s air defense capability, the enemy forces have probably 
established three possible layers of air defense. The sorties are assumed to operate 
continuously in a circulation model with three possible layers of defense on ingress, 




Figure 12.   Circulation Model 
The probability (Ps) of the each F15E surviving each layer of air defense is 
0.95 and the aggregate probability of survival q (3 layers) is calculated as follows.  
 
Suppose X is the number of successful attacks on HDBTs by each wave. This 
means that all 10 F15Es managed to penetrate the three layers of air defense on 
ingress, successfully hit all intended targets in the AO and survived the three layers of 
air defense on egress to return to base safely. 
P[X = 0] = 1 – q 
P[X=1] = q(1-q2) 
The probability distribution function for mission success is given by the 
following. 
 
C.  EVALUATING HTVSF AS A POTENTIAL INVESTMENT  
1. Potential Cost Savings 
The hard-target fuze technology is different from legacy fuzes. A hard-target 
fuze is designed to permit deep penetration of hard targets before detonation. The 
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hard-target fuze relies on a mechanical accelerometer receiving shock signals 
generated by the weapon system decelerating as it hits the surface of the ground and 
penetrates various layers of medium and voids, rather than on the standard time delay 
used in the legacy fuzes. The hard-target fuze programs require the development of 
software algorithms to read the impulses generated by the accelerometer, so as to 
distinguish between the various layers of medium and voids, and these algorithms 
must be performed sufficiently fast as to detonate the weapon effectively. The hard-
target fuze must be shock-hardened in order to survive and continue to function 
despite penetrating multiple layers of hardened concrete, compacted soil, etc. In 
addition, the hard-target fuze, because it is in the direct firing sequence and includes 
the explosives which ignite the weapon, must satisfy a “Fuze, Safe and Arm” 
requirement. Finally, unlike other fuze technology, hard-target fuze technology has 
not yet been successfully developed. As such, significant research and development 
costs and production costs of HTVSF constitute a significant portion of HTVSF life 
cycle costs. The costs savings of employing HTVSF is given by the difference 
between the following two components and shown in the formula. 
 
Net Present Value (NPV)4 of employing FMU-143 in BLU-109 penetrator warhead as 
part of GBU-24 missile system 
 
Net Present Value (NPV) of employing HTVSF in BLU-109 penetrator warhead as 




The main cost components of the analysis are research and development costs, 
procurement costs, aircraft attrition costs and operations and maintenance costs. Table 
3 shows an estimate of the various components of the HTVSF and FMU-143 
employment costs in a particular scenario. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Inflation indices [30] are provided by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA). The inflation 
index used to calculate from base year 2008 to target year 2018 is 1.219. 
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HTVSF  FMU-143  
Research Development 
Test & Evaluation 164.57 0.00 
Procurement  51.42 128.77 
Sortie Attrition  67.72 171.47 
Operations & Support 0.02 0.07 
Total = 283.73 300.31 
Cost Savings = 16.58 
2. Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Cost  
Per [8] the RDT&E cost of a typical missile fuze program is $135M as shown 
in Table 4. All costs are in FY08$M. 
Table 4.   HTVSF RDT&E Cost data 




$135M • HTVSF LCCE is about 
$400M- $450M 
• RDT&E Cost is about 25 
– 35% of LCCE 
(Analysis assumes 30%) 
3. Procurement Cost  
In this BCA, the procurement cost comprises mainly the payload cost (GBU-
24 missile system). For all missions, it is assumed that since the 10 sorties of F15Es 
perform similar missions, they would carry similar payloads. Each F15E carries four 
GBU-24 missiles. Each GBU-24 missile is assumed to cost $65.7K (FY$18) [31] and 
the total payload cost for each sortie is $262.8K (FY$18). It is assumed that the cost 
includes FMU-143 as its delay fuze. Based on cost projections (FY08$) given by the 
Office of Secretary Defense (OSD) and HTVSF production cost data (provided to Dr. 
Daniel Nussbaum but not included in this thesis), a realistic production cost curve 
(Figure 13) is depicted as follows. 
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Figure 13.   HTVSF Production Cost Curve 
From the plotted cost curve as shown above, the learning slope of HTVSF 
production bHTVSF is estimated to be -0.1453 (90%). The theoretical First Unit Cost of 
HTVSF is approximately $153k (FY08$). The impact of changes in bHTVSF and 
corresponding First Unit Cost on Return on Investment (ROI) will be discussed in 
detail later. 
4. Sortie Attrition Cost  
Based on the scenario described above, the aircraft attrition cost is the main 
determinant of the investment potential of HTVSF. From the circulation model, it is 
clearly evident that as the probability of mission success, Pm decreases, the aircraft 
attrition cost increases. As a result, the associated cost penalty for the 10 F15Es for 
each wave is expressed as below. 
 
For a fixed number of targets in the area of operations, it is assumed that the 10 sorties 
of F15Es using missiles equipped with FMU-143 would require more waves than 
F15Es equipped with missiles using HTVSF. The additional number of missiles or 
flights required to destroy the targets is determined by λ . For example, 10 sorties of 
F15Es can carry 40 missiles. Suppose there are 40 HDBTs, it would require one wave 
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for the 10 sorties using missiles equipped with HTVSF subjected to Pm HBTVSF. 
Assuming λ  = 4, where it would require 4 waves for the 10 sorties using missiles 
equipped with FMU-143 subjected to a lower probability of mission success Pm FMU-
143, depending on the number of defense layers as discussed in the circulation model. 
The cost of each F15E is estimated to be $45.4M [32] (FY18$).  
 
Pm HBTVSF and Pm FMU-143 are calculated as follows. As defined earlier, X is 
the number of successful attacks on HDBTs by each wave. It is assumed that if a 
wave is successful, all 10 F15Es managed to hit all intended targets. Using the 
circulation model, 
P[X = 0] = 1 – q = 1- (0.95*0.95) = 0.0975 
P[X=1] = q(1-q2) = 0.167 
P[X=2] = q3 (1-q2) = 0.136 
P[X=3] = q5 (1-q2) = 0.111 
P[X=4] = q7 (1-q2) = 0.0905 
The probability distribution function for mission success of one wave of 10 
F15E sorties using missiles equipped with HTVSF is given by the following: 
. 
The probability distribution function for mission success of four waves of 10 
F15E sorties using missiles equipped with FMU-143 is given by the following: 
. 
5. Operations and Support Cost [19], [33] 
The O&S cost is made up of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs as 
well as Personnel costs. To compute and compare the O&S cost of employing HTVSF 
vis-à-vis the FMU-143, the following key cost considerations will be used. Costs are 
computed in FY18$ [30]. 
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• Launch and Recovery System (LRS), and Mission Control System 
(MCS) Costs 
• Fuel Cost 
• Maintenance and Repair Costs 
a. Launch and Recovery System, Mission Control System Costs 
Taking into account the fact that the Launch and Recovery System 
(LRS) and the Mission Control System (MCS) do not follow a 1:1 relationship with 
the number of F15Es, it is assumed that the cost of the LRS and MCS for each F15E 
comes up to 2% of the individual platform cost per mission. Hence, the LRS and 
MCS costs are estimated to be $0.9M for each F15E. 
b. Fuel Cost 
The F15E is powered by JP-8, the standard aviation fuel used by all 
U.S. Air Force aircraft since 1996. A report from OUSD (AT&L) estimated the 
burdened cost of JP-8 to be about $17.50/gallon, or about $2.62/pound. It is estimated 




The burdened cost of fuel per F15E is about $57,640. The cost of Fuel 
per mission depends on the number of flights that is required for each mission. For 
example, a mission of one wave for the 10 sorties of F15Es (which comes up to a fuel 
requirement of 0.22 million lbs. of JP-8) would cost about $0.58M. 
c. Maintenance and Repair Costs 
The operations maintenance and repair cost is estimated to be about 
1% of the cost of the respective platforms per mission, i.e., $0.45M for each F15E. 
6. Return on Investment (ROI)  
The Return on Investment (ROI) of using a GBU-24 missile system equipped 





D.  BASE CASE 
As discussed earlier, 10 sorties of F15Es are tasked to perform strike 
operations on identified HDBTs in the AO. The sorties will be dispatched from Alpha 
Air Base, 720 nm away from the AO. The analysis aims to compare and evaluate the 
cost of employing missiles equipped with HTVSF against missiles equipped with 
FMU-143.  
Several assumptions were made in the analysis and discussed as follows:  
• The RDT&E cost of HTVSF estimated by Air Mobility Command is 
$164.57M (FY18$) 
• The learning slope of HTVSF production is assumed to be 90% with a 
First Unit Cost of $154k (FY08$) 
• Intelligence reports have identified 40 targets in the area of operations 
• Country A has placed two lines of defense by AA batteries against the 
10 sorties F15Es, and the F15Es are only subjected to AA batteries 
attacks when both flying in and out of AO 
• The probability of survival of each sortie in a wave through a single 
line of defense is 0.95. Hence the probability of survival of each sortie 
in a wave through two lines of defense is (0.95)2 = 0.9025. 
• Once the wave of 10 sorties managed to pass through the two lines of 
defense, it is assumed that all the missiles hit their intended target. The 
missile equipped with HTVSF is able to penetrate and detonate at the 
desired location. However, the missile equipped with FMU-143 may 
and may not be able to survive the impact and penetrate to the desired 
location to achieve the same kill as the former case. Hence, it is 
assumed that λ  = 4 in the base case i.e., for every missile equipped 
with HTVSF, four missiles equipped with FMU-143 are required to 
effectively reach and destroy designated targets.  
• The Launch / Recovery / Missile System Cost is assumed to be 2% of 
F15E platform cost per mission. 
• The maintenance and repair cost of a F15E and missile system is 
assumed to be 1% of F15E platform cost per mission.  
• The operational impact of the attrition rate of the aircraft is not 
considered in the analysis but it is certainly comparable to the cost 
effectiveness of employing HTVSF. 
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Table 5 shows the various cost components of the base case of the analysis 
using the circulation model.  
Table 5.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 




HTVSF FMU-143 Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) 
T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 237.41 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Lines = 2 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4877 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost =    
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  221.29 249.15   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  27.86   
ROI5 (%) =  16.92   
From the analysis and table above, it is evident that more waves are required 
to achieve the intended target kill when using legacy fuze (FMU-143) with a 
Probability of Mission Success (Pm) of 0.4877 and hence a higher aircraft attrition 
cost incurred. The higher aircraft attrition rate will also result in a detrimental impact 
on other operations that require these F15Es, should the need arise.  
                                                 
5 Return On Investment for Base Case is calculated as follows: ROI = (221.29- 249.15) / 164.57 = 
16.92%. 
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E.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
1. RDT&E  
Suppose there is an unexpected technical difficulty in the development of 
HTVSF, which results in the RDT&E cost of HTVSF increasing from 165M to 192M 
(FY$18), which is a 16% increase; given the same scenario, HTVSF cost savings and 
ROI would remain positive as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
192.00 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope)  
T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost = $65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 237.41 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Lines = 2 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4877 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  248.72 249.15   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  0.43   
ROI (%) =  22%   
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2. Subsequent Missions in 2018  
Suppose we employ the GBU-24 missiles again in an immediate mission after 
the base case during 2018, the RDT&E costs would be considered as non-recurring 
costs. Hence, given the same scenario and holding everything else constant, HTVSF 
cost savings would increase by about 700% as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 
missiles equipped with FMU-143 (Subsequent Missions in 2018) (All 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
0.00 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 237.41 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Lines = 2 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4877 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  56.72 249.15   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  192.43 
Note: ROI is not calculated since 
there is no RDT&E Cost in this 
case 
If we employ the GBU-24 missiles again in any immediate mission after the 
base case during 2018, the RDT&E costs would be considered as non-recurring costs. 
If we increase the Probability of survival of the F15Es to 0.98 with only a single line 
of defense, HTVSF cost savings would increase by about 180% as shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 
missiles equipped with FMU-143 (Subsequent Missions in 2018) (All 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
0.00 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  9.27 61.13 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Line = 1 
Pm HTVSF = 0.98 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.8681 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  20.81 72.87   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  52.06 
Note: ROI is not calculated since 
there is no RDT&E Cost in this 
case 
3. Number of Defense Layers  
Suppose Country A employs three layers of defense, the aircraft attrition costs 
would increase for repeated waves of sorties. Hence, given the same scenario, HTVSF 






Table 9.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 
missiles equipped with FMU-143 (Number of Defense Layers = 3) (All 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  66.27 306.09 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Lines = 3 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4877 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  242.38 317.83   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  75.45   
ROI (%) =  45.85   
If Country A employs three layers of defense and the probability of survival 
for the F15E increases from 0.95 to 0.98, the aircraft attrition costs for F15Es 
employing missiles equipped with HTVSF (60%) reduces at a higher rate than 
missiles equipped with FMU-143 (47%). Although there is a 110% deficit in HTVSF 






Table 10.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 
missiles equipped with FMU-143 (Number of Defense Layers = 3, Ps = 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 11.72 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost = $65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  27.25 160.21 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Lines = 3 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4877 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  203.36 171.95   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  -31.41   
ROI (%) =  -19.08 Note: ROI will be positive in subsequent missions  
4. First Unit Cost (T1 HTVSF)  
Figure 14 shows the variation of ROI with respect to T1 HTVSF. Suppose there 
is an unexpected increase in production cost of HTVSF due to economic reasons or 
technological upgrade, which results in the theoretical First Unit Cost (T1 HTVSF) 
increasing from 154k to 635k, given the same scenario, HTVSF cost savings and ROI 
would remain positive. If T1 HTVSF is low at about 20-40K (FY18$), ROI is high at 
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Figure 14.   Graph of ROI (%) against T1HTVSF 
5. Learning Slope of HTVSF Production 
Suppose there is a consistently high production cost of HTVSF due to shortage 
of skilled workers or poor retention of skills which results in no learning rate (100% 
learning slope); given the same scenario, HTVSF cost savings and ROI would remain 













Table 11.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 




HTVSF FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research & 
Development 164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  33.41 11.72 
bHTVSF = 0 (100% learning slope)
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 237.41 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 4 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 4 
Number of Defense Lines = 2 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.4783 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  243.17 249.15   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  5.98   
ROI (%) =  3.63   
6. Values of λ  
The values of λ  are given by the following expression. 
 
As shown in the Base Case, it is evident that the HTVSF cost savings and ROI 
is dominated by the aircraft attrition costs. The Base Case assumes λ  = 4 i.e., for 
every missile equipped with HTVSF, four missiles equipped with FMU-143 are 
required to effectively reach and destroy designated targets. As such, more waves of 
F15Es are required to be dispatched to destroy all the targets if missiles equipped with 
FMU-143 are used. The increased exposure time of the F15Es sorties results in higher 
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aircraft attrition costs. Hence, it follows that an increase in λ will lead to even higher 
attrition costs while a decrease in λ , i.e., λ  = 3, will result in lower aircraft attrition 
costs if missiles equipped with FMU-143 are used. Table 12 shows that λ  = 3 results 
in negative cost savings and ROI if HTVSF is used in the first mission. However, it 
must be highlighted that in subsequent missions, cost savings and ROI will increase 
and make using missiles equipped with HTVSF worthwhile. Table 13 shows that λ  = 
5 results in higher positive cost savings and ROI if HTVSF is used in the first 
mission. 
Table 12.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 9.10 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 185.97 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 3 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 3 
Number of Defense Lines = 2 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.5987 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  221.28 195.08   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  -26.20   




Table 13.   Cost Savings comparison between missiles equipped with HTVSF and 




HTVSF  FMU-143  Basis of Estimates 
Research 
Development Test & 
Evaluation 
164.57 0.00 Program Office Estimate (POE) 
Procurement  11.53 14.35 
bHTVSF = -0.1453 (90% learning 
slope) 
bFMU-143 = -0.2001 (87% learning 
slope) T1HTVSF = 154k 
GBU-24 Missile cost =$65.6k 
(FMU-143 inclusive) 
Aircraft Attrition  45.18 279.35 
Number of Targets = 40, λ  = 5 
Number of waves HTVSF = 1 
Number of waves FMU-143 = 3 
Number of Defense Lines = 2 
Pm HTVSF = 0.9 
Pm FMU-143 = 0.3972 
Operations & Support 0.01 0.02 
Launch / Recovery / Missile 
System Cost = 2% platform cost 
per mission 
Maintenance and Repair Cost = 
1% platform cost per mission 
Total =  221.29 293.72   
Potential Cost 
Savings =  72.43   
ROI (%)=  44.01   
7. Cost Savings, Probability of Survival of F15E and Number of 
Lines of Defense 
Figure 15 shows the interactions between Cost Savings, Probability of 
Survival of F15Es (Ps), Number of Lines of Defense and Number of missions. The 
following observations are made.  
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a. For the Base Case (First Mission) with Three Lines of 
Defense, the Maximum Potential Cost Savings is about 123M 
(FY18$) 
(1) Mission 2 and Subsequent Missions. The Cost Savings 
remains positive for all numbers of defense lines and Ps. This is intuitive as the 
RDT&E cost of HTVSF is considered as non–recurring from Mission 2 onwards. 
(2) For Both Missions. Cost Savings for Ps=0.9 starts to 
decrease at around three lines of defense lines. Cost Savings for Ps=0.95 starts to 
decrease at about seven lines of defense. This shows that the returns of employing 
HTVSF diminish rapidly if Ps is low where aircraft attrition is high, regardless of the 
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Figure 15.   Interaction Plot between Cost Savings, Ps and Number of Lines of 
Defense 
F.  RECOMMENDATION 
It is shown that the higher the number of waves sent to achieve the intended 
target kill, the higher the aircraft attrition cost incurred. Hence, the importance of the 
employment of missiles equipped with HTVSF. Besides, the high attrition rate of 
aircraft using the legacy fuze has a direct impact on the overall operation 
effectiveness as well. 
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A low Ps of F15E will result in a high aircraft attrition rate for missiles 
equipped with both types of fuzes. The Return On Investment (ROI) for HTVSF 
diminishes rapidly with decreasing probability of F15E sorties crossing the enemy’s 
lines of defense. Hence, preserving the Ps of the F15Es is as important as employing 
missiles equipped with HTVSF. 
The HTVSF with programmable void sensing capability appears to be a 
critical investment that can provide the DoD with a new capability in Hard and 
Deeply Buried Target Defeat globally. 
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